Imperial Germany is a prominent historical case in the study of Western Europe's political development. This paper investigates the number and content of political conflict dimensions from the foundation of the modern German state in 1866 to the end of Bismarck's reign as Chancellor in 1890. Methodologically, it applies dimension-reducing statistical methods to a novel dataset of content-coded parliamentary roll call votes. The analysis suggests that the emergence of the Catholic Centre Party in 1871 permanently transformed the conflict space from a single liberal-conservative divide to a two-dimensional space that distinguished positions on socio-economic issues and regime matters, respectively. The fact that positions on redistributive and regime issues were not aligned implies that theories stressing economic inequality as a driver for regime change are of limited applicability. Instead, the case of Imperial Germany highlights the importance of cross-cutting non-economic societal cleavages and the role of societal and political organisations in drawing attention to and perpetuating these divisions.
Political conflict dimensions in Bismarck's Germany
Germany's political development before World War I forms the backdrop for a number of influential theories of democratization (Moore 1966) , party development (Michels 1911) , as well as party system creation and change (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) . Representing the paradigmatic case of the 'late democratizer' in Western Europe, even contemporary scholars of democratization feel compelled to demonstrate that their theories can provide an explanation for the longevity of the Kaiser's regime (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006: 67, 200-201; Ansell and Samuels 2014: 28-29, 52-54) . This study contributes to our knowledge about German political development by identifying the dimensionality and content of the political conflict space during the founding years of the modern German state. It does so by analysing a novel data set of roll call votes taken in the Reichstag of the North German Confederation (1867-1871) and during the first seven legislative terms of the Reichstag of the German Empire (1871-1890). The study period covers Bismarck's entire term as Chancellor, which is often seen as a distinct era in the history of Imperial Germany (e.g., Biefang 2012: 17-18) . The study complements the early dimensional analysis by Smith and Turner (1981) of parliamentary voting in Wilhelmine Germany as well as more recent studies by Debus and Hansen (2010; Hansen and Debus 2012) on parliamentary voting in the Weimar Republic.
However, the study does not only increase our descriptive knowledge about the nature of political competition in an important historical case, it also contributes to the methodological debate about the interpretation of roll call analyses and the theoretical discussion about the causes of regime stability and change. Methodologically, the analysis illustrates the importance of taking the policy agenda into account when interpreting the results of a statistical scaling analysis. Apparent changes in the number of dimensions can be due to the genuine appearance or disappearance of particular conflict constellations as a result of the entrance or exit of actors or issues, or artificially induced by the legislative agenda restraining votes to policy issues related to only a subset of the dimensions. In practice, only substantive knowledge about the content of votes and the historical context of the case can help distinguish between these two scenarios. This is a particularly important issue when analysing parliamentary voting in historical cases with comparatively low levels of legislative productivity and a small number of associated roll call votes. In such circumstances, the results of scaling analyses are particularly sensitive to agenda effects.
Theoretically, the study results inform the debate on economic inequality as a cause of democratization (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Ansell and Samuels 2014; Boix 2003) .
A shared assumption of these political economy approaches to democratisation is that regime preferences are induced by economic interests. If that was the case, political conflict dimensions should be aligned with and reducible to divergent socio-economic cleavages.
However, the findings of the scaling analysis show that such an alignment did not generally exist in 19 th century Germany. For most of the time period studied, positions of party groups varied along two separate dimensions, one relating to socio-economic issues and one to regime matters. This separation was mainly due to the emergence of the Centre Party in 1871, which can ultimately be traced back to a religious cleavage between the Catholic minority and the Protestant majority in Germany. Given the significant influence of this non-economic factor in structuring political competition, theories based on economic inequality as primary causal variable for democratization cannot provide convincing explanations for the longevity of this authoritarian regime.
1
The political system of Imperial Germany
The North German Confederation was established under Prussian leadership in 1867, after
Prussia had defeated Austria in the 'German War' of 1866. A few years later, another victorious war of Prussia, this time against France, paved the way for the accession of the South German states to the Confederation and for the foundation of the German Empire. The constitution of the German Empire of 1871 was largely inherited from the North German Confederation. One of the constitution's most progressive features was the provision of equal suffrage for all male citizens of 25 years' age or older. However, as an intentional 'corrective', the constitution banned the payment of allowances to deputies in an effort to restrict the passive suffrage (Butzer 1999: 29) . It also established a strict separation-of-power system, consciously designed to prevent a parliamentarization of the regime (Rauh 1973: 48) .
The Kaiser remained in full control of the military, and the Reichstag's yearly budget approval right did not extend to the military budget. The Reichstag shared legislative powers with the Bundesrat, which represented the governments of the kingdoms and principalities in this federal monarchy. Contrary to a common misperception, the Reichstag was able to initiate legislation (Anderson 2000: 10) ; and in practice, the approval of bills involved reaching compromises between the Reichstag and the Bundesrat, similar to bicameral bargaining in current-day legislatures.
2 1 For a similar conclusion regarding the value of theories of economic inequality for explaining Argentina's democratic breakdown in the 1920s, based on a similar methodological approach, see Alemán and Saiegh's (2014) . 2 For case study examples, see the descriptions of legislative decision-making in Rauh (1973) or Butzer (1999) .
By occupying several important posts between 1867 and 1890, Bismarck held a particularly elevated position in this system. As Chancellor, Bismarck chaired the Bundesrat and was the only politically responsible member of the imperial government (Reichsleitung). At this point, it should be noted that the fragmented multiparty nature of legislative competition in Germany's national parliament differed from electoral competition at the district level. Partly due to Germany's electoral system with run-off elections in singlemember districts, party political competition at the local level was often limited to two or three parties; and the identity of these parties often depended on local socio-economic, ethnic, or religious cleavages. In the most extreme cases, party competition was not only more limited but almost completely absent, with the election of the candidate of a particular party being virtually a certainty. The Centre Party was particularly successful in that respect, but a sizeable number of Polish and German Conservative seats were similarly secure (Schauff 1973: 307) . Thus, the analysis presented here describes party political competition at the national level, resulting from the electoral aggregation of quite disparate political conflict constellations in electoral districts at the local level.
Figure 1 allows us to make some inferences about the potential influence of different groups and possible majority constellations at the national level in the Reichstag. First, the government could never rely on an exclusively conservative majority. Further source information, the details of the data extraction and coding process, as well as a description and discussion of the distribution of votes across types of decisions are given in the online appendix.
the coding takes the stated policy goals of the proposal as a whole at face value. However, it needs to be acknowledged that this coding procedure is likely to understate somewhat the number of votes that had implications for civil rights and liberties, the relative power of the Reichstag vis-à-vis other institutions, or the relative power of the Reich vis-à-vis its component states. In terms of policy categories, the topic coding scheme of the Comparative Agendas Project was used. 8 Despite being widely used in the study of comparative policymaking, this seems to be the first time that the scheme is applied to a historical case.
In general, the roll call votes in the dataset are mostly about the operation and These prominent pieces of legislation often involved a large number of amendments decided through roll call votes. As long as there is a sizable share of roll call votes in policy areas relating to other conflict dimensions, a strong concentration of attention on a single policy area is not problematic for identifying the dimensionality of the conflict space or the content of conflict dimensions. For the purposes of this study, selection effects of the agenda are only consequential when they focus the attention of the Reichstag on policy areas that relate exclusively to a subset of the dimensions structuring the conflict space. For example, the analysis below shows that the scaling results for the second legislative term of the Reichstag suffer from the effects of a selective agenda; not because its agenda was focused on any single policy area, but because its agenda was focused on a set of policy areas that all relate to a single dimension of a multidimensional conflict space.
From a historical perspective, it is interesting that Figure Table A2 in the online appendix for a full numerical breakdown.
In total, the data consists of 129,579 potential vote choices. These vote choices relate to 322 roll call votes in seven legislative terms by a total of 2884 members of the Reichstag.
Because the third Reichstag was dissolved prematurely, only nine roll call votes were taken during that term. This low number of votes precludes a separate scaling analysis. Hence, this legislative term had to be omitted from the sample. Table 1 shows that, in most other terms, the number of roll call votes ranged between 30 and 50. Only the Reichstag of the North German Confederation (NDRT) stands out for its exceptionally large number of roll call votes (i.e., 81). The large number of roll calls in the NDRT is at least partly a result of the high legislative productivity of this parliament (Pollmann 1985: 433, 451) . It is also noteworthy that the number of legislators per term is usually substantially higher than the number of constituent members at the time, indicating substantial turnover of members within a term. Table 1 also provides further information about the voting data that actually entered the scaling analysis. In total, the scaling analysis is based on 82,310 substantive individual vote choices (i.e. yeah or nay votes). As is standard in the literature, abstentions, absent members, or instances where a legislator was not a member (yet or anymore) at the time of the roll call are treated as missing values. In general, abstentions were extremely rare. They increased somewhat towards the end of the study period, but still constituted only 1 and 4 per cent of the substantive vote choices in the sixth and seventh legislative term of the Reichstag (RT), respectively. Absenteeism was generally rather high. Average turnout ranged between 58 per cent in the NDRT and 70 per cent in RT 2 and RT 6. Given the lack of parliamentary allowances and the long distances to be travelled by legislators, low attendance rates were a permanent problem in the Reichstag (Butzer 1999: 147) . Although the number of roll calls in each term is relatively small compared to many contemporary legislatures, they are generally very informative. The average margin between yeah and nay votes ranged between 19
percentage points in the NDRT and 29 percentage points in RT 7. Thus, almost all roll calls meet the minimum vote margin requirement for the scaling analysis.
The number and content of political conflict dimensions
To estimate legislators' policy positions from the observed vote choices, I employ Poole's non-parametric Optimal Classification (OC) algorithm (Poole 2000; Poole 2005 ). Similar to parametric alternatives, like Nominate (Poole and Rosenthal 2007) or Bayesian Item
Response Theory models (Clinton et al. 2004) , OC assumes that the policy space is Euclidean and that legislators vote sincerely based on single-peaked and symmetric utility functions. In contrast to other methods, OC does not require specific assumptions about the functional form of legislators' utility functions or their distribution of voting errors (Armstrong et al. 2014: 249) . In fact, when minimizing the total number of errors in its classification of vote choices, OC treats all voting errors equally. In situations where the error rate is low or the distribution of errors is unknown, OC has thus clear advantages (Armstrong et al. 2014: 265-266 ).
At least two characteristics of voting in the Reichstag make the application of OC preferable to parametric methods. Firstly, voting cohesion varies considerably across party groups. If some legislators are more likely to toe the party group line than others, the assumption that errors are identically and independently distributed is likely to be violated (Rosenthal and Voeten 2004) . More importantly, as will be shown below, a two-dimensional spatial model fits the observed vote choices almost perfectly. When error rates are so low, parametric methods push ideal points to the edge of the policy space to maximize the loglikelihood (Armstrong et al. 2014: 266; Rosenthal and Voeten 2004) . As a result, distances between ideal points do not only reflect differences in policy positions, but also differences in the number of voting errors. This 'sag' problem exaggerates distances of legislators with extreme and interior policy positions (Armstrong et al. 2014: 269) . One cost of a nonparametric method like OC is that the ideal point scaling results do not come with estimates of the associated uncertainty, but its benefits in terms of more valid ideal point estimates outweigh this shortcoming.
To investigate possible changes in the number and content of conflict dimensions over time, I apply the OC algorithm separately to each legislative term. Table 2 provides an overview of the input data and various model fit statistics. The analysis is limited to legislators who voted in at least 15 roll calls in a legislative term and excludes extremely lopsided votes where the minority consisted of less than 2.5 per cent of voters. Unfortunately, these restrictions are necessary to yield meaningful estimates. As the top part of Table 2 shows, the consequences of the application of these criteria are more pronounced for legislators than for roll calls. Dimensionality of the conflict space
The first step of the analysis examines the dimensionality of the political space separately for each legislative term. Unfortunately, no single best method exists to determine the 'correct' number of conflict dimensions. To make sure the selection of dimensions is robust and provides substantively meaningful results, several statistical criteria were combined. First, as recommended by Poole (2005: 144) , scree plots of the eigenvalues of the double-centred agreement score matrix were examined. Table 2 provides the number of eigenvalues after which the plot flattens out. 10 None of the scree plots indicates a dimensionality larger than three. Thus, in a second step, one, two, and three-dimensional scaling solutions were generated with the OC algorithm. The fit statistics for these solutions in the lower part of Table 2 provide further information about the number of dimensions underlying legislative voting in the Reichstag. To judge the model fit of OC, we can look at the percentage of vote choices that were correctly classified (PCC) and the aggregate proportional reduction in error (APRE) across all roll calls. The latter measure has the advantage that it takes into account the distribution of vote margins (Poole 2005: 129) . APRE provides an indication of the extent to which the OC solution reduces the classification error vis-à-vis a theory-free baseline model that assumes that all legislators vote with the majority.
9 A replication using a threshold of 10 roll call votes does not yield meaningful results. The results regarding dimensionality and the relative location of party groups in the political space are similar when a threshold of 20 or 25 roll call votes is used. 10 See Figure A1 in the online appendix for the actual plots. The first thing to notice about the model fit statistics is that the correct classification rates for all legislative terms are very high. For one-dimensional models, they range between 87.8 per cent in RT 1 and 95.6 in RT 2. Yet for most terms, adding a second dimension still improves the classification rate considerably. For the two-dimensional solutions, the rates vary from 93.5 per cent in RT 1 to 99 per cent in RT 7. Classification rates as high as these leave little room for further model fit improvements as a result of the introduction of a third dimension.
In fact, we can be quite certain that political conflict in the NDRT, RT 2, as well as RT 5 to 7
can be represented in fewer than three dimensions. For these terms, the difference in the rate of correct classification between a three-and two-dimensional solution is one percentage point or lower, and the difference in APRE is less than 5 percentage points. Except for a couple of roll calls in the NDRT, none of the proportional reduction in error (PRE) values for individual roll calls improves by more than 20 per cent when introducing a third dimension.
The model fit improvements for RT 1 and 4 are somewhat larger but still rather marginal.
Using a 5-percentage point increase in the rate of correct classification, a 10-percentage point increase in APRE, and a PRE increase of more than 20 per cent for at least 10 per cent of the roll calls as a combined threshold for judging the gain in predictive power of adding a second dimension, we can conclude that political conflict in RT 1 and RT 4 to 7 was at least two-dimensional. The NDRT and RT 2 show some gain in predictive power when estimating a second dimension as well, but compared to the other terms, it is rather negligible. In summary, the results suggest that political conflict in RT 5, 6, and 7 was almost certainly two-dimensional. Taking into account the number of dimensions indicated by the scree plots, the balance of evidence suggests that political conflict in RT 1 and 4 was also twodimensional, but political conflict in the NDRT and RT 2 was one-dimensional.
Nature of conflict
The content of conflict dimensions is determined by substantive knowledge rather than statistical methods. Such knowledge about the content of votes also helps to further interpret the dimensionality of the conflict space. In the NDRT, the few roll calls whose PRE value increases substantively after allowing for the estimation of a second dimension are quite diverse and cover similar topics to those whose PRE values do not increase substantively. Thus, in isolation, the approach does not provide insights for the interpretation of the substance of the one-dimensional conflict space of this term. In the case of RT 1, comparing roll calls with a small increase in PRE values (< 5 per cent) with roll calls with a large increase (> 20 per cent) indicates that the first dimension captures differences in views about civil rights and liberties as well as the powers of parliament, especially its control over the military budget, whereas the second dimension captures differences in views about the relation between the state and the church, the distribution of competences of regional states vice-a-vis the federal government, and the setting of tariffs. In short, the first dimension bundles 'regime' matters, while the second dimension covers 'economic and social policy'. With respect to the latter, the term 'social'
refers to ideas about the (federal) state's role in society, rather than exclusively redistributive policies.
As the panel for RT 1 in Figure 3 shows, the regime dimension pits left liberals (F), the Even the apparently one-dimensional conflict space of RT 2 can be interpreted in that vein. In RT 2, the first dimension plotted in Figure 3 represents different views on regime matters, with the Centre Party, the minority groups, the Socialists, and the Left Liberals favouring democratic reforms, while the National Liberals, the Free Conservatives and the German Conservatives are protecting the status quo. The second, socio-economic policy dimension does not add much to the statistical model fit (and thus only the one-dimensional solution is shown in Figure 3 ). Still, some indications exist that the second dimension is based on the same type of divisions as in the clearly two-dimensional legislative terms. The few roll calls with a considerably improved PRE value relate to tariffs and the building of a new plenary building for the Reichstag (i.e. trade policy and powers of the federal state).
However, most other roll calls in this term were about matters relating to the regulation of the press, the military, the organisation of Courts, and the proceedings in criminal trials. In other words, with matters relating to the regime dimension. Thus, the apparent reversal to a single dimension in RT 2 is an artefact of a legislative agenda dominated by regime matters rather than real changes in the underlying conflict space. Disagreements over socio-economic issues did not disappear in RT 2, they were just hardly visible in parliamentary activities.
Unlike in RT 1 and 2, the statistically dominant dimension of conflict in RT 4 was the socio-economic dimension, and the regime dimension became secondary. This signifies another but less consequential agenda effect: the change in emphasis in law-making from state-building to policy-making after 1878. In RT 4, the socio-economic dimension captures disagreements about the tariff law, workers' accidence insurance, trade and industry regulations, and taxes. The regime dimension reflects mainly divisions about the adoption of the anti-socialist law and the military law. The regime dimension in RT 5 represents disagreements about matters like the renewal of the anti-socialist law, the abolition of the clergy expatriation law, and the official language of the state assembly of Alsace-Lorraine.
The socio-economic dimension is dominated by disagreements about the tariff law, the domestic commerce regulation, the workers' health insurance law, and the accidence insurance law.
In the political conflict space of RT 6, the socio-economic dimension is again dominated by disagreements about the tariff law. It also captures different views about an amendment of an international trade treaty with Spain, as well as the establishment of a state spirits monopoly. Next to divisions on the clergy expatriation law, the extension of the antisocialist law, and the size of the military, the regime dimension also reflects disagreement about the country's new colonial ambitions. Finally, disagreements about tariffs still factored into the socio-economic dimension of RT 7, but the dimension also reflects divergent views on domestic commerce and bank regulation. The regime dimension is formed by divisions about the size of the military, the length of the parliamentary term, the renewed extension of the anti-socialist law, and the publicity of Court proceedings. Statistically, the regime dimension was the dominant one again in RT 7, which might reflect the partly reactionary agenda of the Kartell coalition that dominated the Reichstag during that term. Somewhat inconsistently, the regime dimension also reflects disagreement about the old age and disability insurance bill. All previous votes on Bismarck's social insurance bills were related to the socio-economic dimension. However, this is the only instance of a roll call vote clearly not conforming to the general pattern.
After having seen how different subject matters relate to distinct dimensions in other legislative terms, we can also revisit the content of the dominant dimension in the NDRT. In contrast to the one-dimensional solution found for RT 2, which results mainly from the selective agenda voted upon during that term, the single dominant dimension of the NDRT included votes on both regime and socio-economic issues. Thus, legislators' positions on these two issue bundles were tightly aligned in the NDRT, but diverged throughout all later legislative terms of the Reichstag.
Discussion
This study examined political conflict dimensions in Imperial Germany during Chancellor Methodologically, the study illustrates the importance of taking changes in the agenda into account when using roll call votes to assess the dimensionality of a political conflict space. Based on purely statistical criteria for the selection of dimensions, we would have concluded that opinions on socio-economic issues did not divide legislators in the second legislative term of the Reichstag from 1874 to 1877. However, a closer look at the substance of legislation voted upon during that term revealed that this finding was a result of the very small number of votes taken on these types of issues. Opposing positions on socio-economic issues had not suddenly converged; they just had little opportunity to manifest themselves in parliamentary activities. In the second Reichstag term, these activities focused on issues related to the regime dimension. Especially in historical cases with comparatively modest legislative productivity, changes in the legislative agenda can have undue effects on the results of a roll call analyses; their interpretation needs to be supported by information about the policy content of votes.
The Centre Party's electoral success in 1871 was based on the activation of a religious cleavage dividing the Protestant majority and the Catholic minority in Germany. At least in Prussia, Catholics were generally economically disadvantaged compared to Protestants.
However, economic inequality did not play a primary role in the mobilisation of Catholic voters. Centre voters came from all economic strata (Nipperdey 2013: 344) . camp. However, a more thorough investigation of this possibility is a topic for future research. As a more immediate conclusion, the study points to the need to delineate clearly the temporal and geographical scope conditions of theories of regime stability and change.
When theoretical arguments presume a particular actor and interest constellation, it is difficult to see how they can provide adequate explanations for cases where these constellations were only partially present, only present during a particular period of time, or
indeed not present at all.
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Appendix 1 Additional tables and figure
• Table A1 : Share of Reichstag seats of party groups by legislative term
• Table A2 : Policy area of roll call vote by legislative term
• Table A3 : Type of subject matter of roll call vote by legislative term 
Table A3
Type of subject matter of roll call vote by legislative term Table A3 shows that the roll call data are dominated by votes on substantively important and legally consequential matters. Overall, almost 8 in 10 roll call votes (77 per cent) took place in the context of a legislative procedure, and another 6 per cent each referred to constitutional amendments and budget matters. The combined proportion of these three types of subject matters was somewhat lower during the NDRT and RT 1. The possibility that this difference is due to the lack of an alternative procedure to count votes when they were too close to call before the introduction of voting by division in 1874 cannot be ruled out. Still, even in these two terms, votes on the three types of subject matters dominated the roll call data (79 per cent in the NDRT, and 81 per cent in RT 1). In general, the overwhelming majority of roll call In most instances, this algorithm resulted in an unambiguous and correct match. The exceptions concern cases where several MdRs with the same surname were representing the same district during the same legislative term. Another reason for incorrect merges were compound names that occur as such in only one of the data sets. Since the fuzzy matching is based on string distances of surnames, some long compound names have larger string distances to one of their component names than to other, completely unrelated names. The linkage algorithm does not take account of that possibility. These cases were manually corrected after reviewing the merge results.
Appendix 2 Detailed description of data sources, collection and coding
Observations that were missing in one or the other of the datasets -and thus could not be merged -point to errors in one of them. Wherever such inconsistencies arose, third sources were consulted to identify which dataset contained the correct information. 16 By matching the voting data with the biographical data, it was possible to add legislative term information for those MdRs in the voting data that never voted, and to add legislative term information for those that were members of several legislative terms, but only voted in some of them. MdRs that did not accept their mandate or whose mandate ended before the first legislative session of the term had started were dropped. Finally, it was possible to identify and correct ten errors in the attribution of votes to MdRs in the General Register, mainly caused by a confusion of identical surnames, and a couple of wrongly attributed electoral districts.
15 Again, computer scripts were developed in Python to automatically download the HTML pages of the database, extract its information, and save it in a CSV file. See the database description at http://zhsf.gesis.org/ParlamentarierPortal/biorabkr.htm. Biographical information about individual MdRs can be browsed at http://zhsf.gesis.org/ParlamentarierPortal/biorabkr_db/biorabkr_db.php (both last accessed 11 April 2016). 16 Particularly useful were the reference books of Reichstag election outcomes by Phillips (1883) and Specht and Schwabe (1904) .
Like the electoral district information, membership in several party groups over time is only indicated as such in the voting data without a specification of when a party group switch occurred. Because the biographical data reports party group membership by legislative term, it was also useful in coding party group membership of individual MdRs over time. If the party group information in the two sources did not coincide, the party group information in contemporary Reichstag handbooks as well as reference books on Reichstag elections (Phillips 1883; Specht and Schwabe 1904) were consulted to identify the correct party group affiliation. 17 The party group information in the handbook was also used to manually review the final party group coding of all MdRs.
Unfortunately, the biographical data does not provide the exact dates of Reichstag membership for individual MdRs, but only the month of the year. In order to identify the population of MdRs eligible to take part in a particular roll call vote, the precise dates of their membership in the Reichstag is required. Starting with the rough periods provided by the biographical data, membership start dates before the precise start date of the first legislative session were replaced with the start date of the first legislative session. Similarly, membership end dates after the precise end date of the last legislative session were replaced with the end date of that session. For membership changes between those dates, Specht and Schwabe (1904) , Phillips (1883) , and Reichstag session protocols and appendices were consulted to identify the precise day of the membership change.
Appendix 3 Face-validity check: Intra-group divisions in the National Liberal Party
As a further face validity check, Figure A2 replicates Figure 
